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RESUMEN 
 
Este trabajo ofrece una explicación teórica de las dificultades asociadas en un 
proceso de descentralización fiscal desde gobiernos nacionales a sub-
nacionales, como es observado en numerosos países en desarrollo. Un marco 
teórico de juegos es usado para mostrar que la escasez del gobierno central de 
un compromiso tecnológico creíble, usado para penalizar el despilfarro fiscal 
de los gobiernos sub-nacionales, puede dar lugar a un nivel incompleto de 
descentralización fiscal. Dos diferentes conjuntos de equilibrios son obtenidos. 
En uno de ellos el gobierno central le conferirá completa autonomía fiscal a los 
gobiernos sub-nacionales, mientras que en el otro el gobierno mantiene la 
autoridad fiscal ya que es óptimo hacerlo. En este caso la economía cae en un 
nivel ineficiente de descentralización fiscal, medido en términos de 
recaudación de ingresos.  
Clasificación JEL: E62, H63, H72 
Palabras Clave: Descentralización, cesasión de pagos, impuestos, gobiernos 
subnacionales. 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper offers a theoretical explanation of the difficulties embodied in a 
process of fiscal decentralization from national to sub-national governments, as 
it is empirically observed in numerous developing countries. A game theoretic 
framework is used to show that the central government’s lack of a credible 
commitment technology, used to penalize sub-national governments’ fiscal 
profligacy, may give rise to an incomplete level of fiscal decentralization. Two 
different sets of equilibria are obtained. In one of them the central government 
will confer complete taxing autonomy to the sub-national governments, while 
in the other the government maintains the taxing authority since it is optimal to 
do so. In this case, the economy falls in an inefficient level of fiscal 
decentralization, as measured in terms of revenue collection.  
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I. Introduction 
 
One of the main recent institutional innovations for developing countries is 
that of fiscal decentralization of decision making authorities to sub-national 
governments, both in terms of the provision of public goods and revenue 
collection. The most widespread approach to decentralization in the public 
finance literature is known as fiscal federalism. It identifies three main 
functions for the public sector in terms of public spending: macroeconomic 
stabilization, income redistribution and resource allocation.  
While macroeconomic stabilization and income redistribution functions are 
assigned to the cen- tral government, sub-national governments should be in 
charge of resource allocation mainly for efficiency reasons. It is argued that 
while some public goods such as national defense confer benefits to the whole 
nation, some other goods such as garbage collection, basic education, etc. are 
more limited in geographical incidence. In such cases, by making decisions 
concerning the provision and financing of such goods at sub-national 
government's level, an optimal level of provision can be achieved. In a 
decentralized setting, sub-national governments choose the “mix" of taxes and 
public goods they consume according to their citizens' preferences.  
Recent history of developing countries shows serious intents of central 
governments to pursue fiscal decentralization both for efficiency reasons and 
as ways to induce fiscal discipline in lower level of governments. International 
organizations also advocate for such decentralization. For example, as stated in 
the Policy Statement on IMF technical assistance, one of the core activities of 
the organization's assistance in the area of fiscal affairs is to collaborate with 
“the design of structural policy reforms, and related institutional reforms, for 
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sustainable revenue mobilization, including macro-significant inter-
jurisdictional issues (e.g. fiscal federalism, tariff reform)”. 
In spite of the efficiency reason stated above, effective decentralization 
rests on institutional structures that may not exist when a process of fiscal 
decentralization starts and it may take time to build such institutions. There is 
not much research, both at the theoretical and empirical level, addressing the 
problems that arise during a decentralization process or analyzing whether 
such process would produce useful results. Among many of the issues which 
deserve attention in order to engage in a process of fiscal decentralization we 
can mention the timing of decentralization and the conditions under which 
such process can be optimally concluded.
  
As mentioned above, a large number of developing countries - Latin 
American countries, African and Eastern European countries - are undergoing 
processes of fiscal decentralization. Whereas each country presents differences 
in such processes, one particular feature observed in many of them is the 
decentralization of some public expenditures without the corresponding 
decentralization of revenues. Moreover, some other elements that are often 
required in order to attain a successful decentralization may not be present in 
these countries. Among them, we can mention: the state of the system of 
intergovernmental grants between different levels of governments, sub-
national governments' capacity to raise taxes and the type of budget constraint 
faced by sub-national governments.  
Regarding the issue of intergovernmental grants, its design is crucial at the 
moment of decentralization, since some of these systems may induce 
irresponsible fiscal behavior on behalf of lower levels of governments. If, for 
example, lower levels of government rely too much on intergovernmental 
grants in order to finance decentralized expenditures, then individuals enjoying 
the benefit of consuming public goods may not bear the total cost of providing 
them. This is known as “lack of fiscal correspondence". Furthermore, if 
transfers are automatically mandated by law, this may induce sub-national 
governments to behave as if they did not face a hard budget constraint, 
increasing government spending and reducing regional tax effort (common 
pool problem). Finally, implicit Central Government bailout assumption also 
acts as a dynamic relaxation of sub-national governments' budget constraint. 
Another important issue is that of sub-national governments' ability to collect 
taxes in order to finance decentralized expenditures, since sometimes 
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bureaucracy operating at lower level of governments is not as efficient as that 
of the national government. To sum up, each process of fiscal decentralization 
may have different outcomes resulting from the different institutional 
structures mentioned above.  
The present study is aimed at analyzing which are the different economic 
configurations that may give rise to a sub-optimal level of decentralization in a 
federal country. In order to match the stylized fact that decentralization of 
expenditures comes before revenue decentralization, we look at an economy 
where expenditure autonomy has already been granted to sub-national 
governments, but revenues are still collected at the national level.  
We develop a model to study the interaction of a Central Government, 
henceforth CG, and Regional or Sub-national Governments (RGs) in the 
context of a real economy. We model two different situations: first, one 
economy which has random endowments. We look for the Equilibrium of the 
game between CG and one RG. CG has to decide whether to grant taxing 
autonomy to the regions or not. We look for the Weak Perfect Bayesian 
Equilibrium, restricting ourselves to pure strategies. We obtain different sets of 
equilibria. There are different configurations of parameters which support 
different choices for each level of government. Choices will depend on 
parameters like endowment volatility, size of the region, default and 
decentralization costs.  
We are interested in looking at the set of beliefs and strategies that give rise 
to the regional taxation equilibrium and to the equilibrium without fiscal 
decentralization. The former is the most efficient in terms of the 
decentralization theorem and reduces the deficit bias observed in regional 
governments. The latter is of interest since many of the countries undergoing 
decentralization fall into this intermediate phase of fiscal decentralization; it is 
worth looking at which configuration of parameters give rise to this 
equilibrium. Secondly, we repeat the game allowing for regional interaction. 
We look for the Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibrium, since as we will show, 
random output plays no restrictions on beliefs, and so, in order to simplify the 
inter-regional game, we eliminated it. Again there are different sets of 
equilibria: one with complete fiscal decentralization and the other with no 
taxing autonomy.  
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a literature review, 
Section 3 presents a model of CG and one RG interaction with uncertainty 
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over output. Section 4 extends the game to allow interaction between RGs and 
the CG. Section 5 provides some explanation of why the model could be 
applied to Argentina and other developing countries and some policy 
implications. Finally, Section 6 concludes.  
 
II. Literature Review 
 
The present section presents a summary of two main issues concerning 
fiscal federalism. The first one is a brief mention to normative aspects of 
decentralization. The second one refers to the problems generally associated to 
fiscal decentralization which are related to the model developed later in the 
chapter.  
The main issues concerning normative aspects of fiscal federalism are 
surveyed by Oates (1999). He reviews the different aspects to be considered in 
the evolution of fiscal federalism theory: how to assign the different 
expenditure and revenue raising functions to the different level of 
governments, which are the gains from fiscal decentralization in terms of 
efficiency, and how to use fiscal instruments (taxes and debt). Finally he 
mentions some recent developments on the field of political economy of fiscal 
federalism, and fiscal decentralization in developing and transitional 
economies as well.  
Classical theory of fiscal federalism (Musgrave, 1959) states normative 
functions for the different level of governments. While Federal Government 
should be responsible for macroeconomic stabilization and income 
redistribution, lower level of governments must take care in the provision of 
public goods whose consumption is limited to their jurisdictions. Oates (1972) 
states the Decentralization Theorem, justifying the local provision of public 
goods based on efficiency reasons: “...in the absence of cost savings from the 
centralized provision of a (local public) good and interjurisdiccional 
externalities, the level of welfare will always be at least as high (and typically 
higher) if Paretto efficient level of consumption are provided in each 
jurisdiction than if any single, uniform level of consumption is maintained 
across all jurisdictions". 
Some of the gains from decentralization appear already in Tiebout (1956) 
model. In his model, in the absence of mobility constraints, agents reside in the 
jurisdiction where the combination of taxes and goods best suit their tastes. 
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Oates (1998) provides evidence of the welfare gains arising from fiscal 
decentralization.  
Another point of relevance for fiscal federalism theory is how to raise taxes 
in order to finance public expenditures and which is the structure of revenue 
raising responsibilities best suited for a decentralized provision of public 
goods. Gordon (1983) presents evidence of distortions originated by 
decentralization of taxes without taking into account the effects of fiscal 
decisions in different jurisdictions (such as exporting tax burden, congestion 
effects, etc.). He presents some normative principles for the use of different 
taxes by different level of governments.  
Another topic often addressed by fiscal federalism literature is that of 
intergovernmental grants, since they may serve different policy objectives. 
Gordon (1983), Feldstein (1975) and Inman and Rubinfeld (1979) discuss 
several aspects of intergovernmental transfers: whether they may serve the 
purpose of correcting distortions, equalizing taxable capacity and transferring 
income from richer to poorer areas. Bradford and Oates (1971) state a 
prescriptive theory of intergovernmental grants where benefit spillovers across 
jurisdictions, revenue sharing and income redistribution are taken into account.  
McKinnon (1997) explores the relationship between decentralization and a 
growing economy and the importance of having subnational governments 
facing hard budget constraints and full separation of monetary and fiscal 
powers. As McKinnon states, a hard budget constraint means that lower level 
of governments must rely in their own sources of revenues in order to finance 
their expenditures. 
Oates (1985) examines the degree of decentralization in a cross section of 
countries and finds that developing countries can be characterized by a high 
degree of fiscal centralization when compared with developed countries. Bird 
and Vaillancourt (1998) and Campbell (2001) provide evidence of the fiscal 
decentralization processes carried out in developing countries. Shah (1998) 
states there are strong gains from pursuing decentralization policies in 
developing countries, ranging from efficiency reasons to increasing 
governance. Oates (1999) mentions the elements which should be present 
when starting processes of fiscal decentralization in developing nations. The 
first of them should be restructuring the system of intergovernmental grants in 
order to remove perverse incentives on behalf of the recipients. Secondly, to 
provide the lower level of governments or decentralized units revenue systems 
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which allow them to reduce the dependence of transfers from higher levels of 
governments. Finally, the federal government must ensure that the 
decentralized governments face restrictions to debt financing to avoid the use 
of such instruments to cover large deficits.  
While existing literature on fiscal federalism provides some insight on 
normative issues like efficiency gains from decentralization, tax assignments 
between the different level of governments, etc. there is much less work done 
on the problem associated with engaging in fiscal decentralization processes in 
developing countries. Tanzi (2000) makes a good account of the hurdles that 
may appear as a consequence of decentralization such as: the size of the 
country, how regulations will change after decentralization, corruption at lower 
level of governments, tax and expenditures assignment, difficulties for tax 
reforms, macroeconomic coordination, regional disparities, timing of 
decentralization and quality of lower levels of government's public 
employment. He stresses the need to further study these issues before 
recommending deepening decentralization processes in developing countries. 
He finally concludes that in some cases it may not even be such a good policy 
recommendation.  
Narrowing down the literature to problems associated to fiscally 
decentralized countries we mention two pieces of work from which the model 
developed later builds on. One refers to the timing of decentralization and the 
other to the bailout mechanisms behind RG’s and CG interaction. As far as the 
timing of decentralization is concerned, Garcia Mila and McGuire (2001) 
develop a model to explore the more frequently observed sequence for 
decentralization: decentralization of expenditures followed by tax 
decentralization. They test their model for Spain and find evidence that there 
might be inefficient regional borrowing (sub-national governments borrowing 
“too much" from central government) resulting from this timing for 
decentralization.  
Incentives for regional borrowing depend on the regions' expectations about 
how the federal system of finances is going to evolve. Their results suggest 
that if taxing authority is given back to the regions, then sub-national 
borrowing can efficiently correct any initial revenue deficiency. But, if 
regional governments expect the central government to increase grants as a 
response to the increase in regional borrowing, then a “soft budget constraint" 
is created and there is a tendency to too much borrowing.  
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Qian and Weingast (1997) find that in a context of fiscal federalism and, to 
the extent that lower level of governments do not have access to a central bank 
to bail them out, they will be facing a “hard budget constraint". However, if 
they gain indirect access to the central bank through intergovernmental 
transfers, then, their budget constraints are softened.  
Cooper et al. (2005) study the different repayment paths of regional debt 
issued by members of a federation. They found that if CG is able to commit 
not to bailout RGs, then the former will use its taxation power to smooth 
distortionary taxes across regions. Without commitment CG will bailout RGs 
to smooth consumption and distortionary taxes across regions. These two 
solutions result in different welfare implications.  
Among the approaches to fiscal federalism we can consider the Second 
Generation Fiscal federalism (SGFF) based on the first generation (which 
considers only benevolent planners who seek to maximize the welfare of 
society, ignoring the objectives of permanence in office). The second 
generation models deal specifically on the importance of political parties and 
how regional governments act to protect their power from the central 
government, and the importance of democratic systems, among others 
(Weingast, 2013). In this paper we focus on first generation model, the model 
we develop in the next sections builds on some aspects of both Garcia Mila 
and McGuire (2001) and Cooper et al. (2005). Two further features have been 
added: strategic action between CG and RGs and the modeling CG bailout vs. 
taxing decisions. 
The model developed can be applied to different developing countries 
engaged in processes of fiscal decentralization. We focuse on Argentina, in 
1989-1990 the country suffered two episodes of hyperinflation and sank into 
macroeconomic stagnation. In 1991 a newly elected government launched a 
program of deep structural reforms. Among the most important reforms we can 
mention a currency board which pegged the domestic currency (Argentine 
peso) to the US dollar together with a law (called Convertibility Law) which 
prevented the Central Bank from issuing domestic money if it was not backed 
by foreign reserves. Money supply depended on the amount of reserves in the 
hand of the Central Bank. In this sense, the currency board eliminated the 
“inflation tax”, but this mechanism was soon replaced by issuing debt, 
guaranteeing regional debt with national revenues or transfers. The peg, 
however, implied some well known policy trade-offs. Among many others, this 
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exchange rate regime prevents the government from printing money to finance 
its deficits. In this sense, one of the results of adopting a currency board is that 
it acted as implicit hardening of the budget constraint. Given the structure of 
all level governments in Argentina, Convertibility meant that the CG should 
introduce reforms outcome after the monetary one. The fiscal reform rested on 
two pillars: prohibition of financing in the tax system and in government 
expenditures. In this sense, the fiscal reform was an expected deficits by 
printing money (derived directly by the restrictions of the Currency Board) and 
the beginning of a process of fiscal decentralization, giving back decision 
power to RGs. At the time of decentralization, the main pro-decentralization 
reasons were efficiency and a way to induce fiscal discipline in RGs, given that 
CG monetary bailouts would no longer be possible. The country moved fast in 
terms of expenditure decentralization, but faced harder challenges when 
attempted tax reforms. Revenue collection is still highly centralized. Basically, 
CG collects most of the taxes and redistributes back to RGs through a 
complicated tax-sharing agreement of intergovernmental grants called 
“Coparticipacion Federal de Impuestos”. This creates a severe vertical 
imbalance problem (as it can be observed in Table 1), which was often 
followed in the past by several GB bailout episodes, not financed by issuing 
money but debt. This imbalance is unequal and becomes very high for some 
provinces (like fomosa, Corrientes, Santiago del Estero) reaching 80% of 
provincial revenues (Ardanaz et al., 2013). 
As mentioned above, while the reform program succeeded in reducing 
inflation, it was not able to achieve fiscal discipline (at least at the sub-national 
level). This indiscipline caused great indebtedness and forced the central 
government to abandon the peg and to default on its debt.  
Saiegh and Tommasi (1999) state that the two most important problems in 
Argentina’s fiscal structure are the lack of fiscal correspondence between sub-
national revenues and expenditures and the central government recurrent 
bailouts of sub-national units. First of all, there is a lack of fiscal 
correspondence, with very little tax effort on behalf of the provinces and a 
large proportion of services provided by them. Second, the bailout problem, 
where CG generally bails out lower levels of government, creates a moral 
hazard problem. Argentina is a federal country, where the regional 
governments (23 provinces and a federal district) enjoy a great deal of 
autonomy: expenditures are highly decentralized and provinces have 
12                                                               ECONÓMICA 
 
borrowing autonomy. However, taxes are still heavily centralized at the 
national government. Taxes are collected by the Central Government (CG) and 
then re-distributed in the form of transfers to the provinces (RG) through a 
system called “Coparticipacion Federal” (tax-sharing agreement). Provinces 
differ in both share of the national income and in population. The tax-sharing 
agreement as it is today presents two main drawbacks:  
1. The unit of redistribution of CG revenues is the region and not the 
households. This has been historically the case since governors of the different 
regions give their support to the CG. The power of each governor in the Upper 
house of the Congress does not bear any relationship with the population or 
share of income of the different regions. So bigger regions are under-
represented and smaller regions are over-represented. As a consequence, per 
capita transfers differ widely across regions.  
2. The second problem is derived directly from the first one, and it is the 
deficit bias that this way of sharing transfers creates. For bigger and wealthier 
provinces (wealthier in terms of higher share of income, not in terms of per 
capita income), the incentive to run deficits is too big: they create most of the 
taxable income of the country and they are not able to reap its benefits 
Similarly, poorer regions do not have any incentives to reduce their deficits 
either. In this case, any fiscally responsible region will receive fewer transfers 
than its fiscally irresponsible neighbor. But, regardless of the wealth or the 
regions, there is a lack of fiscal correspondence between the benefit of 
enjoying public goods and the cost to provide them. Moreover, the fact that 
RGs have borrowing autonomy makes matters even worse, since many 
provinces generally run large deficits, borrow abroad and then wait for the CG 
to bail them out. 
Provinces collect few taxes, and on average provincial expenditure is 
financed only by one-third of own resources of each province. According to 
political or economic circumstances, during the last decades the federal 
government has discretionaryly  allocated funds to the provinces, despite the 
provisions of the Ley Federal de Coparticipación (Ardanaz et al, 2013).  
The main contribution of the present paper to the existing literature is that it 
provides a theoretical explanation of why central governments may be 
reluctant to give taxing authority to regional governments or why regional 
governments have no incentives to claim taxing responsibilities once they have 
been granted expenditure responsibilities. 
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III. A Game between CG and one RG 
 
We develop a simple two period model to study a real endowment 
economy. The country is undergoing a process of fiscal decentralization, 
expenditures are decentralized at a regional level but revenues are still 
centralized at the national level. The economy is populated by N identical 
agents who live for two periods. There is a CG and two regional governments 
(RG1 and RG2). Population in each region is N1 and N2, respectively, they may 
not necessarily be equal and Δ and (1 - Δ) are the population shares of each 
region. Individuals cannot move from one region to the other. Agents have 
endowments in both periods. Individuals live for two periods where the 
superscripts “y” and “o” will stand for young and old respectively. 
While there is certainty in period one endowment, period two endowment is 
random, but perfectly correlated across regions, and takes the value high (Y
 h
) 
with probability p and low (Y
 l
) with probability (1-p)
1
. Expenditure policy is 
determined at the regional level. In period one CG makes g transfers to the 
provinces. Following Mila et al. (2000) we consider the transfers of period one 
to be exogenous and assume that there is a mismatch between g, and RG 
spending in this period in order to introduce RG's borrowing or lending as in 
McGuire et al. (2001).  
We are going to assume that only RG1 is active and issues debt, while there 
is no mismatch between CG grants and RG'2s expenditures. This can be 
thought of, for example, RG2 having borrowing restrictions in its constitution. 
The timing of the game is as follows: 
Stage one: 
 CG sets exogenous transfers to the provinces and decentralizes 
expenditures. 
 RGs issue bonds 1
jb , j = 1; 2, to finance the gap between CG’s transfers and 
desired spending. Debt can be held in either region, and the superscript j 
indicates the region were debt is held. 
 All young agents make decisions in anticipation of period two government 
policies. 
                                                          
1 All variables are expressed in per capita terms. 
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At stage two, CG and RG play the following game which can be observed 
in the tree below: 
 Regional governments observe the realization of endowments Yh or Yl, high 
and low endowment respectively. 
 CG decides to give taxing authority (TA) to RG or not (NTA). 
 If CG gives taxing authority to RGs, RGs can choose to levi the tax (T) by 
charging individuals of Region 1 a proportional tax τ1 on endowments or 
pass the obligation to the CG (NT). 
 CG can choose to bail out (BO) RGs by means of an economy wide tax τ  
proportional to regional per capita endowments. 
 If CG does not levi an economy-wide tax, RGs will default (D), paying a 
penalty cost δ. 
 If CG does not pass the taxing authority (NTA) to RGs then it pays off 
RG'1s debt by means of an economy wide tax τ proportional to regional per 
capita endowments. 
We search for a Weak Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (WPBE) of this game, 
restricting ourselves to pure strategies. CG cannot make credible threats not to 
bail out RG1. We will analyze the equilibria when the CG lacks this 
commitment power.  
The solution for the first period optimization problem and for CG-RG1 
game with a complete derivation of the payoffs can be found in Appendix A. 
 
Figure 1. 
Game 
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III.1. Payoffs 
 
In period one, agents in each region solve a standard maximization problem 
deciding consumption (of a public, 
y
ig  and 
o
ig , and a private good 
y
ic i and 
o
ic
) and Region 1 debt holdings 
1
ib . 
Agents are able to smooth private and public good consumption, achieving 
intertemporal efficiency, but, due to the lack of regional taxation in period one, 
intratemporal efficiency is not achieved. Issuing regional debt does not correct 
for initial mis-funding of regional governments.
2
 
In the second period, there is a game played by CG and RG1. Each 
government has different payoffs according to their welfare functions.  
While RG1 maximizes second period per capita consumption for their 
citizens, CG has to optimize a welfare function that includes a population 
weighted average of per capita consumption for the second period and an 
autonomous consumption for CG,  .  
We can write the welfare function of CG as follows: 
 
1 2(1 )
CG o oW c c                              (1) 
 
 is a parameter which captures the cost of a bailout. This parameter can be 
understood as an “extra effort" on behalf of the Central Government once it 
has given taxing autonomy to the regions. We are going to consider  as fixed, 
but in a more complicated environment, it can be made a function of  , the tax 
rate: the higher the tax rate, the higher the reduction in CG consumption; or a 
function of the population shares, since the bigger the region the more costly is 
a bailout. For the CG, the welfare of a CG bailout will then decrease, the 
higher the level of regional debt.
3
 
While CG does not know the realization of endowments when deciding 
whether to grant taxing autonomy, RG does. The rationale for this comes from 
                                                          
2 This is the same result obtained in Garcia Mila and McGuire (2001). 
3 In the context of tax decentralization, the CG loses sources of revenues and so it has to resort 
to reduce its consumption in order to finance the regions. 
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the fact that in general RGs possesses much more information about the 
productivity and the real possibilities of their economies than the CG. A 
principal agent problem arises, where it is costly for the CG to monitor the 
activity in the regions.  
 
III.2. Equilibria 
 
We look for the Weak Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (WPBE),
4
 restricting 
ourselves to pure strategies. As mentioned before, we obtain different sets of 
equilibria. There are different configurations of parameters which support 
different choices for each level of government. We are interested in looking at 
the set of beliefs and strategies that give rise to the taxing autonomy-regional 
taxation equilibrium and to the equilibrium without fiscal decentralization. The 
former is the most efficient in terms of the decentralization theorem and 
reduces the deficit bias observed in regional governments. The latter is of 
interest since many of the countries undergoing decentralization processes may 
stay in this intermediate phase of fiscal decentralization, with a problem of 
“vertical imbalance" and CG’s bailouts.  
 
3.2.1 Equilibrium with fiscal decentralization and regional taxation  
 
Proposition1. Under the following condition
5
 
  
               (2)  
there exists an equilibrium where CG grants taxing autonomy to RG1 and RG1 
taxes its citizens. 
 
Intuitively, this equilibria will be supported for high bailout costs -high 

- 
which lowers CG autonomous consumption.
6
 The smaller the size of the 
region ∆, the higher the range of values within which this equilibrium will be 
supported, since the welfare function of CG is a population weighted average 
                                                          
4 Please refer to Appendix A for a detailed analysis of equilibria. 
5 The proof of this proposition appears in the Appendix. 
6 If TA has been granted, it means CG has to resort to additional taxes in order to bailout the 
regional government. 
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of second period consumption. Finally, small default costs   relative to   
increase the feasibility of this equilibrium. This fact looks a little 
counterintuitive, since it is sometimes suggested by the literature that 
increasing default costs may induce sub-national government discipline. Here 
what matters is  and its relationship to  , and not its absolute value.  
It is interesting to note that output volatility does not matter for the CG 
decision to grant taxing autonomy or not. Output volatility matters only to the 
decision of RG whether to tax or not once taxing autonomy has been conceded. 
1
( )E R b
  
  
   defines the maximum level of debt which can ∆ be held in 
equilibrium in each region).  
 
3.2.2 Equilibrium without fiscal decentralization 
 
Proposition 2. Under the following condition
7
  
  
              (3)  
there exists an equilibrium where CG will not give taxing autonomy to RG1 .  
 
Here CG always prefers not to grant taxing autonomy regardless of p. 
Again, output volatility plays no role in CG decision. Low decentralization 
costs make a CG bailout after taxing autonomy has been granted more 
attractive, and so CG prefers not to give taxing autonomy in the first place.  
There are no restrictions on CG beliefs for which CG will prefer a bailout 
to a default. It only depends on the fiscal cost of a bailout  with respect to the 
default costs  in CG’s government function. This also depends on R1 
population, since allowing default is more costly the bigger R1 is. Given that 
CG always bailout R1, then it is always the case than RG1 will not choose 
regional taxation, regardless of output realization. Here regional tax effort is 
non-existent and complete fiscal decentralization will never take place.  
                                                          
7 The proof of this proposition appears in the appendix. 
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This equilibrium is easily supported the higher the size of R1 (∆) and the 
higher default costs  . Ex-post consumption for individuals living in R1 is 
higher than for the ones in R2. This is because they get to repay less than in the 
case of regional taxation, since the tax is spread between the two regions.  
 
IV. A game of regional interaction 
 
While the simple model presented in the previous section where only one 
region is active sheds some light about why a country may end up in a process 
of incomplete fiscal decentralization, it is useful to study what happens when 
regional interaction is taken into account, since it is a more accurate 
representation of what happens in decentralized countries.  
Here we present a model where two regions (RG1 and RG2) interact while 
CG must decide whether to grant taxing autonomy to regional governments. In 
order to simplify the game studied we eliminate output volatility, since we 
showed it played no major role in CG decision. Otherwise the model is the 
same than the one developed in the previous section.  
The timing of the game is as follows: 
Stage one:  
• CG sets exogenous transfers to the regions and decentralizes expenditures.  
• RGs issue bonds bi to finance the gap between CG’s transfers and desired 
spending.  
• All young agents make decisions in anticipation of period two government 
policies.  
In stage two, CG and RGs play the following game, the corresponding tree 
can be observed below:  
• CG decides to give taxing autonomy (TA) to RGs or not (NTA).  
• If CG gives taxing autonomy to RGs, RGs play a simultaneous move game 
where they can choose to levy a regional tax i  (T) or pass the obligation to 
the CG (NT).  
• CG can choose to bail out (BO) RGs by means of an economy wide tax  .  
• If CG does not levy an economy wide tax, RGs will default (D), paying a 
penalty cost  .  
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• CG does not pass the taxing autonomy (NTA).  
 
Figure 2. 
Game 
 
 
We search for a Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPNE) of this game. 
The CG cannot make credible threats not to bail out RGs. We will analyze the 
equilibria when the CG lacks this commitment power.  
 
IV.1. Payoffs 
  
The period 1 optimization problem is analogous to the one with one region, 
but there is no uncertainty and now individuals can hold bonds of either 
region.  
In the second period, payoffs are also derived similarly to the single region 
case. The welfare functions of CG and RG1 remain the same. Now, we add 
RG2, whose welfare function corresponds to per capita consumption of its 
citizens in the second period. The solutions to the maximization problem and 
to the second period game appear in Appendix B. 
 
IV.2. Equilibria 
 
We now look for the Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) of this 
game. As in the case of only one active region, we are interested in looking at 
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the equilibrium with complete fiscal decentralization and to the one where CG 
keeps its taxing autonomy.  
 
4.2.1 Equilibrium with fiscal decentralization and regional taxation  
 
Proposition3. Under the following condition: 
 
                           (4)  
there exists an equilibrium where CG will give taxing autonomy to RGs and 
RGs will tax its citizens.  
 
As in the case in which only one region is active, this payoff corresponds to 
the state where complete fiscal decentralization is achieved. This is the “good 
equilibrium” in terms of the decentralization theorem. Here each region will 
bear the full cost of repaying period one debt by taxing its citizens.  
As in the one region model, the equilibrium with taxing autonomy depends 
on the size of the regions and default costs relative to bailout costs. However, 
the condition is more restrictive than in the single region case, since ∆ < 1 for a 
given  .  
 
4.2.2 Equilibrium without fiscal decentralization  
 
Proposition 4. Under any of the following conditions: 
,  (1 ) ,          
             (5) 
,  (1 ) ,          
             (6) 
,  (1 ) ,          
             (7) 
there exists an equilibrium where CG will not give taxing autonomy to RGs.  
 
CG will not grant taxing autonomy in the following:  
case a) 
,  (1 ) ,          
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For this configuration of parameters   CGNTA BO . Here default costs are 
high relatively to the loss in CG welfare caused by the NTA option. Fiscal 
decentralization is not complete. Thus, CG always prefer a bailout to a default 
once they grant taxing autonomy, so the no taxing autonomy alternative will 
be chosen in the first place.  
case b) 
,  (1 ) ,          
 
In this case, CG will proceed to a bailout whenever RGs play (NT, NT), and 
whenever RG1 does not tax.  
However, even when CG would allow default in R1, this will not happen, 
since R1 incentives are to deviate and play No Tax, since CG will bail both 
regions out. Here   CGNTA TA . 
case c) 
,  (1 ) ,          
   
This case is symmetric to b), but R2 is the region where default will be 
allowed. Again both regions will play (NT, NT), and   CGNTA TA . 
One interesting point in cases b) and c) is that while in each of the cases 
there are incentives for one region to tax, knowing that a bailout is feasible in 
the event of the other region default, the region where default will be allowed 
ends up being bailed out as well. This result provides support for the moral 
behavior of RGs. As long as CG will bailout one region, then none of the 
regions will choose taxation, even when they have incentives to do so.  
 
V. An application to Argentina and some policy implications  
 
The model developed in the previous section can be applied to different 
developing countries engaged in processes of fiscal decentralization. In what 
follows we will take a close look to the Argentine case, since the country 
underwent a process of fiscal decentralization together with a program where 
CG gave up the management of monetary policy. In the past fifty years, 
Argentina presented a long history of fiscal indiscipline, with large bailouts to 
RGs financed using the “inflation tax”. For example, the “inflation tax” 
amounted to 11.3% of total revenues in 1983. As the inflationary process 
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accelerated by the late eighties, there was clear political consensus that this 
way of deficit financing had to be be ended.  
The models presented before can be applied to the Argentine economy with 
some caveats. For example, the population weights ∆ and (1 − ∆) in CG’s 
welfare function are not representative for Argentina, due to the fact that CG, 
for political reasons redistributes resources across regions according to other 
factors different from population. In Argentina, CG often needs governors’ 
support in Congress, so in terms of transfers to the provinces it is often the 
case that per capita transfers are higher in low densely populated provinces. 
Currently, the tax sharing regime is based on the following weights, 65% on 
population, 10% according to demographic dispersion and 25% according to 
the development gap, defined as the difference between each province wealth 
with respect to the richest one.  
With regards to the parameter  , we can mention one interesting example 
of this “extra tax effort” on behalf of the CG. In 1994, the Social Security 
System was privatized at the national level but some provinces kept the old 
PAYG system. Given that CG abandoned the state-funded PAYG system, the 
amount of instruments in the hands of the CG available to bailout regions was 
reduced. CG had to resort to borrowing, which resulted in an accumulation of 
an unsustainable level of debt.  
As regards to CG transfers to RGs, past expenditure decentralization in 
Argentina has been an attempt to begin to improve the problem of resource 
allocation from the point of view of expenditures. But the main drawback of 
such process has been the impossibility of achieving some degree of tax 
decentralization. CG has lost control over expenditure decisions -making any 
adjustment more difficult- and, at the same time it must raise revenues in order 
to finance sub-national expenditures. The transfers to sub-national 
governments are automatically guaranteed by the Tax Sharing Agreement, 
which poses a burden on Central Government accounts. Any economic 
downturn complicates the fiscal solvency of the Central Government, since it 
has to provide funds to the regional units with little flexibility in expenditure.  
As far as bailouts from CG are concerned, as Nicolini et. al. (2002) 
conclude: 
“there were several episodes of bailout in the relationship between 
provinces and the national government. The main features of those episodes 
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were associated with jurisdic- tions running very unsustainable fiscal policies 
that at some point moved the province into almost bankruptcy”.  
Finally, it is worth mentioning the last episode of CG bailout. Before the 
abandoning of the Convertibility, the RG had issued “monies” worth $6 
billion. In 2002-2003 the CG bailed out the provinces by absorbing their debt 
once again.  
At this point, we will point out some policy implications that can be drawn 
directly from the model presented. Among them we can mention: limits to 
regional debt, structure of debt return and default costs.
8
 
If issuing debt is not allowed for RGs, then the problem of bailout episodes 
disappears. But this solution is hard to implement in a context of federal 
countries, since many times Regional Governments existed before the country 
was constituted and had their own constitutions.  
Also, debt allows regions to achieve intertemporal efficiency in 
consumption, which will not happen if the regions are forced not to issue debt. 
Some countries (Switzerland and Norway for example) have limits for their 
sub-national governments as to what they can finance by issuing debt, for 
example, it is not possible to finance current expenditures. Debt issuing is used 
instead to finance infrastructure projects, where the benefits are enjoyed and 
paid not only by the current but by future generations.  
Increasing default costs have two opposite effects. On one hand, they 
reduce the attractiveness of RG’s default with respect to the costs of regional 
taxation. But, on the other hand, they increase CG incentives for a bailout in 
the first place, unless the region we are considering is sufficiently small.  
 
V.  Conclusions 
 
The advocacy towards fiscal decentralization both in the provision of public 
goods and in revenue collection is a prevalent policy recommendation across 
international institutions. Many developing countries and transition economies 
are engaged in such processes, but so far and to different extents, some 
countries have failed in achieving an efficient level of fiscal decentralization, 
either because the vertical imbalance is worsened, consolidated fiscal deficit 
                                                          
8 This eliminates the problem of bailouts, but not the vertical imbalance associated by not 
decentralizing revenues. 
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increases, bailout episodes become more frequent or even the quality of public 
goods provided deteriorates in some regions.  
It is often the case that some central governments find it very difficult to 
discipline sub-national governments and thus, the implementation of complete 
fiscal decentralization may not happen. We developed two very simple models 
in a game theoretic framework to analyze interactions between a regional and a 
central government and then we allow regions to interact with the central 
government. Our results suggest that according to different parameter 
configurations we can obtain two sets of equilibria, one where complete fiscal 
decentralization is achieved and a second one, where it is not. Contrary to our 
priors, endowment volatility played no role on central government beliefs. In 
the first case, where only one region is active, the model can be understood as 
follows: CG is mechanism used by RGs to pass to each other tax pressure to 
finance their expenditure levels, here, only from RG1 to RG2.  
The different sets of equilibria obtained will have different welfare 
implications for the individuals in each region. The equilibrium with regional 
taxation would be the one preferred by individuals in Region 2, while 
individuals in Region 1 prefer to be bailed out by the Central Government. As 
it was mentioned before there are different parameter configurations that 
matter for the choice of equilibrium. The first of them is regional size, since 
the Central Government weights each region according to its population: the 
bigger Region 1 is, the lower the range of parameters for which the Central 
Government will give taxing autonomy. Finally, debt holding distributions 
should be taken into account, since any legal limitation to the holding of debt 
outside the region or debt caps to regional debt will also work in this direction.  
When we allow for regional interaction, our results do not change 
significantly. There are still different parameter configurations which sustain 
an equilibrium with decentralization and another one without it. The 
interesting addition is that even in the case where the central government will 
allow default for one specific region, such region has an incentive to deviate 
from taxing, since the central government will proceed to a bailout if both 
regions default. In this sense, it corroborates the idea of existence of “moral 
hazard”, as long as CG is willing to bailout one region.  
Among the many extensions which can be considered, we will mention 
some for future work. The assumption that R is exogenous can be too strong, 
since regional debt returns play a role in deficit sustainability in most federal 
countries. Also, default costs are set to be fixed and exogenous. The game can 
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be extended to a multiregional context, and with different specification of 
welfare functions for the Central Government. As far as the sequence of the 
game is stated, we made no comment as to why CG starts by decentralizing 
expenditures first; we model it in that way since it is the most common trend 
observed in practice. Probably, it is due to political reasons that 
decentralization evolves in this way. Here we take the sequence as given.  
Also, the model can be modified to allow for monetary policy aiming at 
studying welfare implications of a central government bailout by means of an 
inflation tax. In the models we have presented, there is no difference between a 
nation-wide tax and an inflation tax, but the model can become more 
sophisticated by allowing some regional or agent heterogeneity with different 
welfare effects between the two options for bailout. 
Finally, as it is showed in most of the literature concerned with default, 
default never arises in equilibrium in our model while we do observe defaults 
of regional and central governments in practice.   
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Appendix A  
 
1. Game with no regional interaction  
 
A.1 Period 1 Optimization  
Individuals derive utility from consumption of a private and public good. 
Region i young agents solve: 
   
,
max , ,
i i
i j
y y o o
i i i i
b b
u c g Eu c g 
 
            (8) 
for i = 1, 2 where u is assumed to be concave, subject to:  
y i y
i ic b Y                            (9)  
y y
i ig g b                           (10)  
 ( ) 1 ( )o oi i i ic E R b E Y                          (11)  
( ) ( )o y oi i i ig g E R b E Y T                  (12) 
i j
i i ib b b               (13)  
where all the variables are expressed in per capita terms. g
y
 is real transfer 
when young to agents on region i, g
o
 is real transfer when old to agents on 
region i, 
y
iY  is endowment when young, ( )
o
iE Y , random endowment when 
old, 
ib  is debt held in region i, 
j
ib  is debt issued in region i and held in region 
j, τi is a regional tax and τ is a common tax collected by CG, 
    
2
1 21
1
t
YYT 
 are total tax revenues and ∆ and (1 − ∆) are 
population shares of R1 and R2 respectively. 
R is the return on regional debt and is considered to be exogenous
9
 taking 
two values: Rh when output is high and R
l
 = αRh , with 0 < α < 1.  
                                                          
9 In our simple setting we just consider R to be exogenous but positively correlated with 
endowments. This result appears in the literature, and it can be justified as follows: we can think 
of a closed economy, operating near full capacity, with adjustment costs to increase the stock of 
capital in the short term. Any positive shock will push up marginal productivity of capital, until 
investment is fully adjusted, showing pro-cyclical behavior of interest rates. 
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Given some initial conditions, this maximization problem is well defined 
and has explicit solutions for consumption and regional government debt 
holdings for some parametrical assumptions about the utility functions.  
The first order conditions for this problem are: 
( ) : '( ) '( ) ( '( )) ( '( ))i y y o yi i i i ib u c u g E Ru c E Ru g              (14)  
( ) : '( ) ( '( ))j y oi i ib u c E Ru c                          (15)  
The left hand side of (14) is the marginal cost of giving up consumption 
today. In this sense, increasing public good consumption reduces this marginal 
cost. The right hand side represents the marginal benefit of consumption 
tomorrow. From (14) and (15) we obtain:  
'( ) ( '( ))y yi iu g E Ru g                (16) 
and 
'( ) '( )
( )
( '( )) ( '( ))
y y
i i
o o
i i
u c u g
E R
E u c E u g
 
                      (17) 
(17) is the standard intertemporal efficiency relationship between present and 
future consumption for private and public goods. Here, agents are able to 
smooth private and public good consumption, achieving intertemporal 
efficiency, but, due to the lack of regional taxation in period one, intratem- 
poral efficiency is not achieved. Issuing regional debt does not correct for 
initial mis-funding of regional governments.
10
  
 
A.2 Period 2 payoffs  
In order to consider the second period payoffs we make some simplifying 
assumptions. First, we A.2 assume a linear utility function 
      i i iu c c g   
and g
o
 = 0, which means that in equilibrium, b
1
 = b
2
 = b. Also, we assume CG 
automatic transfers in period two will be equal to zero.  
As mentioned in the text, the second period payoffs are regional 
consumption and population weighed consumption for RG and CG 
respectively.  
                                                          
10 This is the same result obtained in Garcia Mila et al. (2000). 
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A.2.1 CG gives taxing autonomy and RG1 taxes its citizens.  
This payoff corresponds to the state where complete fiscal decentralization 
is achieved. This is the “good equilibrium” in terms of the decentralization 
theorem. Here R1 individuals will bear the full cost of repaying period one 
debt. This equilibrium will be the one “preferred” by R2 individuals.  
The payoffs when endowments are high correspond to: 
2(1 )
1
bRG o h
hW c Y R


  
 and W
CG 
= Π + Yh , which are the welfare functions 
of the regional and central government respectively.  
Similarly, we can derive the payoffs when endowments are low, 
2(1 )
1
bRG o h
tW c Y R


  
and W
CG 
= Π+Yt. When endowments are low, return 
on regional debt is R
l
 = αRh . The parameter α ranges between zero and one 
and it is the default rate, i.e. a low realization of endowment means partial 
default on period one government debt. If α = 1, debt can still be repaid when 
endowment is low. Incomplete information on behalf of the CG plays no role 
in determining the different equilibrium of the game. By introducing default 
risk, we will be able to look at two different things: the role of endowment 
volatility as a parameter that affects the result of the game and the role of 
informational asymmetries between CG and RG, in the sense that the latter 
knows the state of the economy before than the former.  
Regardless of the realization of endowments, ex-post consumption in R1 is 
lower the higher the proportion of debt held in R2 . R1 individuals bear the tax 
burden to repay the debt held in R2. This will produce an analogous result to 
the one found in Cooper et. al. (2003), where they find an equilibrium with 
regional taxation when debt is held just in R1 .  
 
A.2.2 CG gives taxing autonomy, RG1 does not levi a regional tax, and CG 
bails out RG by means of higher economy-wide taxes.  
Payoffs when endowment is high are 
2(1 )bRG h
hW AY R


 
, where 
(1 )
1A
   
  
  , and           WCG = Π− γ+Yh.  
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Payoffs when endowment is low are 
2(1 )bRG h
tW AY R


 
 and W
CG 
= Π 
− γ + Yl.  
We are assuming that CG charges an uniform tax rate τ in both regions. 
Here, A is greater than one, so payoff for the RG1 will be higher than in the 
case of regional taxation regardless of the level of b
2
. This seems reasonable, 
since RG2 citizens bear also the burden of higher taxation in period two. This 
result will be preferred by RG1 citizens, since they can enjoy higher 
consumption in period one and share the burden of re-paying debt with R2 
individuals. CG has the above mentioned cost γ, due to the fact that it has 
already given taxing authority to the regions, and so bailouts entail a higher 
effort that lowers CG autonomous consumption.  
 
A.2.3 CG gives taxing autonomy, RG1 does not levi a regional tax, and CG 
allows default.  
   Payoffs when endowment is high are: WRG = Yh − δ and W
CG
 = Π − ∆δ + Y h. 
Payoffs when endowment is low: WRG = Yl − δ and W
CG
 = Π − ∆δ + Yl. 
 
A.2.4 CG does not give taxing autonomy   
Here, the fiscal decentralization process is not complete. Regions do not 
enjoy taxing autonomy, so the process of fiscal imbalance may worsen. This 
creates deficit biases in region 1.  
Payoffs when endowments are high are 
2(1 )bRG h
hW AY R


 
and W
CG 
= 
Π+Yh. Payoffs when endowment is low are 
2(1 )bRG h
tW AY R


 
and W
CG 
= 
Π+Yl. 
 
A.3 Equilibria 
In order to define a Weak Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium we must define a 
set of strategies and system of beliefs (σ, µ) such that σ is sequentially rational 
given the system of beliefs µ and the system of beliefs µ is derived from 
strategy profile through Bayes’ rule whenever possible.  
The joint strategies for both players are:  
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Γ=Γ(CG,RG)={[(TA,BO), (T,T)], [(TA,BO), (T,NT)], [(TA,BO), (NT,T)], 
[(TA,BO), (NT,NT)], [(TA,D), (T,T)], [(TA,D), (T,NT], [(TA,D), (NT,T)], 
[(TA,D), (NT,NT)], [NTA,-i]} 
 where i is any action taken by RG1 . 
 
 A.3.1 Last Stage of the Game  
CG will prefer BO to D for the following sets of beliefs:  
( ) (1 )( ) ( ) (1 )( )h hCG l lBO D Y Y Y Y                    
which requires γ < ∆δ, with no restrictions on CGs beliefs.  
If γ < ∆δ, there are no restrictions on beliefs, and CG will always prefer to 
bail out the regions than to allow default. As γ increases, a bailout becomes 
more costly in terms of CG welfare. This also will depend on the size of R1 and 
the technology that penalizes default. Note than here, increasing default costs, 
increases the set of values of γ for which CG will prefer a bailout. Also, there 
are no restrictions on beliefs µ, so output volatility does not matter in order for 
the CG to choose a course of action.  
 
A.3.2 Second Stage of the Game  
RG1 has the following strategies for each realization of endowment:  
(T,T), (T,NT), (NT,NT), (NT,T) 
a) CGBO D      
a.1. Left node: RGNT T , whenever τ (1 − ∆) ≥ 0, which is always the case. 
RG will always choose no regional taxation. 
a.2. Right node: RGNT T  , whenever τ (1 − ∆) ≥ 0, which is always the case. 
RG will always choose no regional taxation as in the left node. Here again, 
output volatility plays no role in the set of strategies that is chosen.  
Whenever RG1 knows CG will proceed to a bailout, then, they will never 
choose to tax its citizens, since by a bailout RG1 can pass the cost of repaying 
RG1 debt to R2 individuals. This means higher consumption for R2 agents in the 
second period.  
b) CGD BO     
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b.1. Left node RGNT T  , whenever 
21 hR b
  
  
   (*)  
b.2. Right node: RGNT T , satisfied whenever 
21 hR b 
 
  
  (**). 
Default costs δ which satisfy (**), will also satisfy (*), since α < 1. If, (*) 
holds but (**) does not, then RG will choose taxation in the bad realization of 
endowment but no taxation when endowments are high. This seems a little 
counterintuitive, since one would expect that the lower realization of output 
would induce the RG to be more inclined towards a bailout. This depends on α. 
When α is small, then the tax effort in terms of output is low, so consumption 
will increase with regional taxation relative to default. By increasing default 
costs, the set for which (*) holds is reduced, but the probability of a CG bailout 
increases. Unless the loss in welfare γ for CG is too high, then increasing 
default costs have this potential harmful effect in terms of regional taxation.  
 
A.3.3 First Stage  
a) CGBO D    , and RGNT T , under τ (1 − ∆) ≥ 0, CGNTA TA is 
always preferred regardless of p. Here, output volatility plays no role in 
deciding whether CG will give taxing autonomy or not. Given that CG will 
bailout RG, then it prefers not to grant TA in the first place, increasing CG 
welfare by gamma.  
b) CGD BO    and RGNT T , under (*) and (**), then CGNTA TA , 
always.  
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Appendix B  
 
1. Game with regional interaction   
 
B.1 Period 1 Optimization  
Individuals derive utility from consumption of a private and public good. 
Region i young agents solve:   
 
 
    oioiyiyi
bb
gcugcu
i
j
i
i
,,max
,

                                     (18) 
for i = 1, 2 where u is assumed to be concave, subject to: 
y i
i ic b Y               (19)
               
y y
i ig g b                (20)
           
 1oi i i ic Rb Y                   (21)  
                           
o y
i i i i ig g Rb Y T                (22)
                          
i j
i i ib b b                           (23)
           
where all the variables are expressed in per capita terms, and the same 
notation than in the one region case applies, with the exception that here, η1 = 
∆ and η2 = (1 − ∆)
11
, which means whenever CG collects an economy wide 
tax, it redistributes back according to each region population. R is the return on 
holding regional Government debt, and is considered to be exogenous.  
Again, given some initial conditions, this maximization problem is well 
defined and has explicit solutions for consumption and regional government 
debt holdings for some parametrical assumptions about the utility functions.  
The first order conditions for this problem are:  
                                                          
11
 We can analyze the case of different ηs according to different redistribution schemes. 
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( ) : '( ) '( ) ( '( )) ( '( ))i y y o yi i i i ib u c u g Ru c Ru g                                  (24)  
( ) : '( ) '( )j y oi i ib u c Ru c                (25)  
The left hand side of (24) is the marginal cost of giving up consumption 
today. In this sense, increasing public good consumption reduces this marginal 
cost. The right hand side represents the marginal benefit of consumption 
tomorrow. From (24) and (25) we obtain:  
'( ) '( )y yi iu g Ru g                                         (26) 
and 
'( ) '( )
'( ) '( )
y y
i i
o o
i i
u c u g
R
u c u g
 
                                  (27) 
with the same implications than in the one region case, where, due to the lack 
of regional taxation in period one, intratemporal efficiency is not achieved. 
Issuing regional debt does not correct for initial mis-funding of regional 
governments.  
 
B.2 Period 2 payoffs  
In order to consider the second period payoffs we make the same 
assumptions than in the one region case. First, we will assume a linear utility 
function as in the one region case u(c
y
) = c
y
 and g
o
 = 0, which means that in 
equilibrium, 
bbbbb  22
2
1
1
2
1
1 .
12
 
Finally, CG transfers in period two will be equal to zero. RG1 and RG2 
governments are concerned with the welfare of its citizens, their welfare 
function equals consumption in the second period. We will assume the same 
welfare function for the CG than in the previous case: 
 CG 1 2W  c   1 c     
o o       
                                                      (28)                                          
Also, we will assume that γ is constant regarding whether CG has to bailout 
one of both regions. The results do not change if we allow γ being region-
population weighted and output is the same for both regions, their only 
difference being population size. Our final assumption is that if CG is 
                                                          
12 While total per capita debt held in each region is equal, its composition is not defined. 
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indifferent between granting taxing or not, it will choose the former. We will 
write in turn the different payoffs for each state of nature.  
 
B.2.1 CG gives taxing autonomy and RG1 & RG2 tax their citizens 
CGW Y  
1 1 2
1 2 1
1
cRG oW Y Rb Rb
 
     
   
2 2 1
2 1 2
1
cRG oW Y Rb Rb
 
     
   
 
B.2.2 CG gives taxing autonomy, RG1 taxes its citizens, RG2 does not tax 
and CG allows default.  
(1 )CGW Y     
1 2
1 1
1
cRG oW Y Rb
 
    
   
2 2
2 1c
RG oW Y Rb      
 
B.2.3 CG gives taxing autonomy, RG1 taxes its citizens, RG2 does not tax 
and CG bails out RG2.  
CGW Y     
1 1 2 2
1 2 2 1
1
c (1 )RG oW Y Rb Rb Rb
 
             
2 2 1 2
2 2 2 1c [ ]
RG oW Y Rb Rb Rb      
 
B.2.4 CG gives taxing autonomy, RG1 does not tax its citizens, RG2 taxes 
and CG allows default.  
CGW Y    
1 1
1 2c
RG oW Y Rb      
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2 1
2 2c
1
RG oW Y Rb
 
    
    
  
B.2.5 CG gives taxing autonomy, RG1 does not tax its citizens, RG2 taxes 
and CG bails out RG1.  
CGW Y     
1 1 2 1
1 1 1 2c (1 )[ ]
RG oW Y Rb Rb Rb       
2 2 1 1
2 1 1 2c [ ]
1
RG oW Y Rb Rb Rb
 
       
    
  
B.2.6 CG gives taxing autonomy, RG1 & RG2 do not tax and CG allows 
default.  
CGW Y    
1
1c
RG oW Y     
2
2c
RG oW Y     
 
B.2.7 CG gives taxing autonomy, RG1 & RG2 do not tax and CG bails out 
RGs.  
CGW Y     
1
1c
RG oW Y   
2
2c
RG oW Y   
 
B.2.8 CG does not give taxing autonomy.  
CGW Y  
1
1c
RG oW Y   
2
2c
RG oW Y   
 
B.3 Equilibria  
The joint strategies of the three players are: 
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Γ = Γ(CG,RG1,RG2) = {[(TA,BO), (T,T), (T,T)], [(TA,BO), (T,T), (T,NT)], 
[(TA,BO), (T,T), (NT,T)], [(TA,BO), (T,NT), (NT,NT)], [(TA,BO), (NT,T), 
(NT,NT)], [(TA,BO), (NT,NT), (NT,NT)], [(TA,BO), (NT,NT), (NT,T)], 
[(TA,BO), (NT,NT), (T,T)], [(TA,BO), (NT,T), (T,T)], [(TA,BO), (T,NT), (T,T)], 
[(TA,D), (T,T), (T,T)], [(TA,D), (T,T), (T,NT)], [(TA,D), (T,T), (NT,T)], 
[(TA,D), (T,T), (NT,NT)], [(TA,D), (T,NT), (NT,NT)], [(TA,D), (NT,T), 
(NT,NT)], [(TA,D), (NT,NT), (NT,NT)], [(TA,D), (NT,NT), (NT,T)], [(TA,D), 
(NT,NT), (T,T)], [(TA,D), (NT,T), (T,T)], [(TA,D), (T,NT), (T,T)], [(NTA),-i,-
j]} 
where i is any action taken by RG1, where i and j are any action taken by RG1 
and RG2 respectively. In order to define a Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibrium 
we must define a set of strategies Γ such that Γ constitutes a Nash Equilibrium 
in every sub-game.  
 
B.3.1 Last Stage of the Game  
CG will prefer BO to D for the following configuration of parameters:  
1. (1 ) (1 )CGBO D Y y             
2. CGBO D Y y           
3. CGBO D Y y           
If 1) and 2) are satisfied BO dominates D, 3) will be satisfied too.  
 
B.3.2 Second Stage of the Game  
There are four different cases, in each of them RG1 and RG2 play a 
simultaneous move game.  
Cases:  
1.  ,(1 ) , CGBO D             
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  RG2 
  T NT 
RG
1 
T 
1 2
1 2 1
1
co Y Rb R b
 
    
   
1 2 2
1 2 1 2
1
c (1 ) [ ]o Y R b b b
 
     
 
 
2 1
2 1 2c
1
o Y Rb R b
 
    
    
2 2 1
2 1 2 2c [ ]
o Y Rb R b b     
N
T 
2 1 1
1 1 2 1
1
c [ ]o Y R b b b
 
     
 
 
1c
o Y  
2 1
2 1 2c
1
o Y Rb R b
 
    
    
2c
o Y  
 
The NE of this subgame is (NT,NT).  
 
2. ,(1 ) , CGD BO             
 
 
  RG2 
  T NT 
RG1 
T 
1 2
1 2 1
1
co Y Rb R b
 
    
   
2
1 1
1
co Y R b
  
   
   
1 1
2 2 2
1
co Y Rb R b
 
    
   
2
2 1c
o Y Rb     
NT 
1
1 2c
o Y Rb     1c
o Y    
1
2 2c
1
o Y R b
 
   
    
2c
o Y    
 
The NE depends on the parameters, there can be four different equilibria: 
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I) (NT, NT) whenever 
2
1
1
R b
  
  
   and 
1
2
1
R b
 
  
    autarky, no 
debt holdings. 
II) (NT, T) whenever  
1
2
2
1
1
11
bRbR 















 only RG1 issues debt. 
III)  (T, NT) whenever 
1 2
2 1
1
1 1
R b R b
    
    
       only RG2 issues debt. 
IV)  (T, T) whenever 
2
1
1
R b
  
  
   and 
1
2
1
R b
 
  
   default cost are 
high. 
 
3.  
(1 )
CG
CG
CG
BO D
D BO
BO D
 
 
 
 
  
    
 
   RG2 
  T NT 
RG1 
T 
1 2
1 2 1
1
co Y Rb R b
 
    
   
2
1 1
1
co Y R b
  
   
   
2 1
2 1 2c
1
o Y Rb R b
 
    
    
2
2 1c
o Y Rb     
NT 
1 1 2
1 2 1 1c (1 )( )
o Y Rb R b b      1c
o Y  
2 1 1
2 1 1 2c [ ]
1
o Y R b b b
 
      
    
2c
o Y  
The NE of this subgame is (NT, NT).  
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4.  
(1 )
CG
CG
CG
BO D
BO D
D BO
 
 
 
 
  
    
 
  RG2 
  T NT 
RG1 
T 
1 2
1 2 1
1
co Y Rb R b
 
    
   
1 2 2
1 2 1 2
1
c (1 )o Y R b b b
 
     
   
2 1
2 1 2c
1
o Y Rb R b
 
    
    
2 2 1
2 1 2 2c
o Y Rb R b b        
NT 
1
1 2c
o Y Rb     1c
o Y  
1
2 2c
1
o Y R b
 
   
    
2c
o Y  
 
The NE of this subgame is (NT, NT).  
 
B.3.3 First Stage of the Game 
Cases:  
1. 
,(1 ) ,         
 
For this configuration of parameters, CGNTA BO . Here default costs are 
high relative to CG welfare loss by not granting taxing autonomy. Here only 
expenditure decentralization takes place. CG always prefers a bailout to a 
default once they have granted taxing autonomy, so no taxing autonomy is 
going to be granted in the first place. 
 
2. 
,(1 ) ,         
 
and 
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a) 
1
2
1
R b
 
  
   , 
2
1
1
1
R b
  
  
   . For this configuration of parameters, 
CGTA NTA . 
b) 
1
2
1
R b
 
  
   , 
2
1
1
1
R b
  
  
    . Here, there is an equilibrium where (No 
Tax, Tax), and debt is issued  only by RG2, and CG
TA NTA . 
c) 
1
2
1
R b
 
  
   , 
2
1
1
1
R b
  
  
   . Here, there is an equilibrium where (Tax, 
No Tax), and debt is issued  only by RG1, and CG
TA NTA . 
d) 
1
2
1
R b
 
  
   , 
2
1
1
1
R b
  
  
   , (No Tax, No Tax) then CGTA NTA , no 
debt is held in equilibrium. 
 
3.  
(1 )
 
 
 

  
   
(NT, NT) then CGNTA TA . 
 
4. 
(1 )
 
 
 

  
   
(NT, NT) then CGNTA TA . 
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Argentina Brazil Chile Mexico Latin American (average)
Decentralization (1) (%) 49.3 45.6 13.6 25.4 14.6
Vertical Fiscal imbalance (2) (%) 56.0 33.0 61.0 61.0 52.0
Borrowing autonomy(3) 3.0 2.9 0.0 1.8 n/a
(1): the ratio of sub-national/total government spending
(2): the ratio of intergovernmental to total revenue
(3): the value of the index ranks from zero,(no borrowing autonomy) to a maximum of four points.
Source: Inter-American Development Bank, Fiscal Stability with Democracy and Decentralization, 1997
Table 1
